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Abstract 
The correlation between financial audit and corporate governance increased significantly after the release of financial crisis. 
This study aims to identify the corporate governance factors that influence the audit quality. The audit quality is measured 
in terms of BIG 4 companies and the research is conducted upon Romanian Market. The individual factors include audit 
fees, the existence of audit committee, the number of executive directors and other individual financial indicators. The 
results provide evidence that the existence of corporate governance elements do positively influence the audit quality of the 
entity, especially when it comes to the number of members that the executive board has. Considering the other variables, 
mixt results were detected. 
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1. Introduction 
The release of recent financial crisis revealed important shortcomings in corporate governance practices even 
though important improvements have been done at international level. In 1999, the OECD endorsed the 
Principles of Corporate Governance where guidelines both for regulatory and legislative framework were 
provided. The guideline was offered for OECD members and non-OECD members. It is considered that good 
corporate governance can positively influence the financial markets, the economic growth and the investment 
level (OECD, 2004). Recently, in 2014, the process of reviewing the principles of corporate governance started, 
with the aim to confer a conclusion of them within one year.  The purpose of this review is to give advice on 
corporate governance practices for shareholders, investors or other national or international bodies that set 
specific standards.  
On the other hand, it has to be considered that the existence of corporate governance is not enough in order 
to ensure financial credibility. According to the agent theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
managers and shareholders have different interests, as managers are more inclined to report the results on which 
they can gain private benefits. The literature is focusing on the fact that the agency cost can be mitigated by the 
existence of a financial auditor, as he is independent and can reduce the mistrust that exists among shareholders 
regarding manager’s way of reporting. Eccles et al, 2012 consider that firms that have a higher level of 
sustainability provide additional information to their shareholders, information that is checked during a 
financial audit process.  Moreover, if the auditor is a company from BIG 4 then higher transparency to the audit 
process is considered to be provided (Michaely  and Shaw, 1995, Rahman,1998). 
Based on these assumptions, this research tries to detect the corporate governance factors that can influence 
the decision of a company to have a BIG 4 company as financial auditor. The analysis is conducted on 
Romanian market, on the entities that are listed on Bucharest Stock of Exchange. 
The remain of the paper is structured in several sections: section 1 presents the some background  of the 
correlation between financial audit and corporate governance, section 2 reveals the methodology of research, 
section 3 focuses on results and discussions, while section 4 provides conclusions, limits of the research and 
future perspective. 
2. Literature review 
Several reports have been issued over time with the purpose of improving the corporate governance 
practices. For example, in UK, the Cadbury Report, 1992 focused mainly on division of top responsibilities 
such as independence of non-executive directors and the lack of power of decision at individual level, while the 
Greenbury Report, 1995 relies more on directors’ remuneration and the Hampel Report, 1998 summarizes the 
board principals. The financial scandals (Enron case), were followed by other reports such as Higgs Report, 
2003 that focuses on the role that the audit committee has. Other regulations were established though Smith 
Report, 2003 that is concerned with the problems regarding the independence of audit and on the fact that the 
auditor should also check for the reality of corporate governance indicators.  
The OECD principals of corporate governance also mention the correlation between financial auditor and 
corporate governance indicators.  For example, shareholders can ask questions about external audit process 
when they have any misunderstandings. The independence of financial auditor is also a particular aspect upon 
which the principals are focusing on. Moreover, the external auditor should be recommended by an independent 
audit committee and it should also analyze the value of non-audit elements. 
It can be said that the existence of corporate governance is related with increasing the quality of audit that 
the company has, but on the other side, it is considered that the role of financial auditor should be increased in 
order to enhance reliable corporate governance practices (Baker et Owsen, 2002). 
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Regarding the correlation between the choose of auditor and the corporate governance variables, it seems 
that countries that have higher audit enforcement and that spend more on audit processes (BIG 5 companies), 
have a corporate governance system with high investors protection (Francis et al, 2003). On the other side, Choi 
and Wong, 2007 show that financial auditors play an important role in entities that have a weak level of legal 
enforcement, where the protection of outside shareholders is low. 
On a research conducted by Lin and Liu, 2009  the empirical results provide evidence that the companies 
with large controlling shareholders, the existence of CEO/chair duality and a small size of their supervisory 
board are less likely to hire a top financial auditor. In another paper, Ianniello et al, 2013 also revealed that the 
CEO/Chair duality is negatively correlated with the probability of having a BIG 4 as financial auditor. On the 
other hand, the size of the board of directors is positively related with the choice of a BIG4 financial auditor.  
Regarding the Romanian market, fewer studies have been conducted on the correlation between financial 
auditor and corporate governance. One of them is the study conducted by Dobre et al, 2012 where they proved 
that information regarding corporate governance and information about the audit committee structure influence 
in a positive way the auditor quality (mainly measured by BIG 4 companies) and the way it is implemented. 
3. Methodology of research 
The purpose of this research is to provide evidence about the correlation between corporate governance 
indicators and the choice of financial audit. In order to reveal it, we conduct an analysis upon the entities that 
had to report their individual financial statements using IFRS as compulsory. From all the entities (71 
considering the last report of Financial Supervised Authority-see Appendix A), we excluded the entities that 
had a negative value of their own capital between 2010 and 2012 – the period consists in 2 years before IFRS 
reporting and the year when the switch between Romanian regulation and the International one was 
implemented. Moreover, both the companies that were in insolvency between 2010 and 2012 and the entities 
that did not provide information about financial auditor’s remuneration were also excluded from the initial 
sample. The dimension of the sample upon which the analysis was conducted was of 41 firms. As no relevant 
information about the auditor’s remuneration has been found from 2012, the analysis is conducted using data 
from 2011. The data have been collected from each company individual site and from the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange site. 
In order to reveal what are the corporate governance factors that influence the type of auditor a probit model 
was used. As a fact, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial auditor is one of 
the BIG 4 companies and 0 otherwise (the variable was coded as AUD). We consider that if a company chooses 
a financial auditor from BIG 4 companies then the quality of financial auditor is higher  
The independent variables are both qualitative and quantitative variables. Thus, some of them are firm 
specific indicators such as company’s debt (measured by dividing the total debt to the company’s own capital 
and coded LEV), profitability indicators such as return on assets for 2011 (coded 2011ROA ) and return on assets 
measured a year before (for 2010- 2010ROA ), the value of the audit fees (measured though the logarithmic value 
of audit’s remunerations- coded  LOGAF ), the size of the company measured through the value of logarithmic 
total assets and coded LOGTA.  
The qualitative variables include mainly information about the corporate governance indicators. At such, the 
following dummy variables have been used: CEO variable (coded DCEO) that takes 1 if the CEO/chair duality 
do not exist or in other words, if there is a difference between CEO and the chairman of the company, system 
variable (coded DSYST which takes 1 if the company has a one tier system and 0 if the company has a two tier 
management system, a composed variables (coded DCMPV) that takes into account the CEO/chair duality and 
the type of management system that the company has. At such, the variable takes value 1 if the CEO variable is 
1 or the System variable is 0.  Another dummy variable that was included into the analysis is the variable that 
reveals if the company does have an audit committee (we coded it DCOMT) and we confer value 1 if in the 
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company’s corporate governance document there is evidence about its existence. We also included a 
quantitative variable that measures the numbers of executive members of the board of directors (coded: 
MRBS).  
The assumptions about the corporate governance factors upon which the analysis is conducted are: 
 
H1: A company with CEO/chair duality is less likely to choose a high quality financial auditor. 
H2: A company with one tier unit system is less likely to choose a high quality financial auditor. 
H3: A company that doesn’t report CEO/chair duality or that has a two tier unit management system is more 
likely to choose a high quality financial auditor. 
H4: A company that has an audit committee is more likely to choose a high quality financial auditor. 
H5: A company that has a large number of executive directors is more likely to choose a high quality 
financial auditor. 
 
The model upon which the analysis was firstly conducted has the form presented in equation  (1) 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
where iH   is the error term. 
Several models have been estimated for each corporate governance variable and the model with higher 
McFadden value was selected.  
4. Discussions and results                                       
In order to reveal the correlation between the choice of financial auditor and specific firm characteristics, we 
firstly provided information about the correlation that exists among the variables that were included into the 
analysis. The results are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix 
 
Element AUD DCEO  DSYST  DCMPV D COMT MBRS ROA2010 ROA2011 LOGTA LOGAF  LEV 
AUD  1.000                     
DCEO  0.061 1.000                   
DSYST -0.193 -0.245 1.000                 
DCMPV 0.061 0.231 -0.245 1.000               
D COMT 0.029 0.173 -0.354** -0.037 1.000             
MBRS 0.422* 0.186 -0.125 -0.019 0.201 1.000           
 -0.171 0.049 0.032 -0.146 0.165 -0.051 1.000         
 0.208 -0.099 -0.031 -0.004 -0.088 0.211 -0.172 1.000       
  0.561* 0.145 -0.291 0.158 0.277 0.591* -0.082 0.298* 1.000     
  0.147 -0.097 -0.343** 0.121 -0.026 0.062 -0.068 0.276*** 0.351* 1.000   
LEV 0.187 0.28** 0.130 -0.334** -0.092 0.053 -0.117 -0.160 0.012 -0.206 1 
 
iiLEViAFLOGiTA
LOGiROA
iROAiMBRSiDCOMTiDCMPViDSYSTiDCEOiAUD
HDDDD
DDDDDDD

 
*11)(*10)(*92011*8
2010*7*6*5*4*3*21
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Where *,**,*** denotes  statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
From table 1 it can be seen that larger the company is, higher the probability of having a financial auditor 
from BIG 4 companies is. This explanation is due to the value of the correlation coefficient which is 0.561. 
Another correlation can be detected between the size of the company, measured through the logarithmic value 
of total assets and the number of executive members from the board of directors. It seems, that number of 
executive directors increases with the firm size. Another important correlation that can be seen is the correlation 
between the type of financial auditor and the number of executive members from the board of directors. The 
value of the correlation coefficient is 0.422. As higher correlation values can create bias coefficients, we 
decided, after the whole model was estimated, not to include those variables into the analysis even though 
previous studies, such as the one conducted by Lin and Liu, 2009 have done it. 
The results obtained are presented in table 2. 
 
Table2. The factors that influence the choice of financial auditor 
 
Dependent variable : AUD 
Constant 3.6308 -4,3200 -0.3869 -1,4699 -2,6859 -7.0341*** 
CEO  -0.5667 -0,0413 
(p=0,9363) 
    
DSYST -0.9570  -1.0088 
(p=0,1678) 
 -0,7618  
DCMPV 0.2372   0,3699 
(p=0,4728) 
  
D COMT -0.0513    0,1242 
(p=0,8117) 
 
MBRS 0.4391**     0.4349** 
ROA2010 -10.3022    -7,0132 4.2272 
ROA2011 6.5563 7,2900 8,3821*** 6,1139 8,0512 -9.8703 
LOGAF 0.3270 0,6447   0,4695 0.8423 
LEV 0.5408*** 0,4429*** 0,4352*** 0,4313*** 0,4482*** 0.3993 
Mcfadden 31,37% 11,54% 13,60% 9,08% 16,49% 27.31% 
LR statistics 14,11 
(prob=0,1182) 
5,19 
(prob=0,2678) 
6,12  
(prob=0,1058) 
4,13 
(prob=0,24) 
7,56 
(prob=0,2798) 
12.44 
(prob=0.0292) 
 
Where *,**,***denotes  statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
 From table 2, it can be seen that only the numbers of executive members from the board of directors 
influence statistically significant the type of financial auditor. As a fact, higher the number of executive 
members from the board of directors is, higher the probability to choose a BIG 4 company as financial audit is. 
Consequently, hypothesis H5 is confirmed.  
Regarding the other corporate governance variables, it can be seen that their coefficient is not statistically 
significant from zero. An explanation of this could be due to the fact that the study has few variables and 
moreover, the dependent variable has less values of 1 than values of 0 (only 10 companies from our sample 
chose to have as financial auditor a BIG4 company. Even though the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, we also looked at the sign associated with them in order to reveal if our assumptions of research are 
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reliable. It can be seen that there should be a negative correlation between the choice of high quality financial 
auditor and the CEO/chair duality variable, so H1 is theoretical confirm by our results. It can be said that 
companies with a CEO/chair duality indicator are less likely to contact a financial auditor as a company from 
BIG4. Similar conclusions can be formed considering hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. As a fact, if the company has 
a one tier management system then the probability of choosing a high quality financial auditor is smaller than 
the probability of choosing it when the company has a two tier management system.  Regarding our results, it 
can be seen that the probability associate to DSYST variable is 0.1678, which is higher than 0.10, so no proper 
assumptions about the statistical significance of the associated coefficient can be formed out. On the other hand, 
it has to be considered that our analysis is conducted on 41 companies, so the sample dimension is low. As a 
fact, if we assume a higher risk to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically not significant 
from zero, then H2 is confirmed due to the fact that the probability associated with the model validation is also 
fewer than 16.78%. 
When it comes to a combination between CEO/chair duality and tier management system, it seems that if a 
company doesn’t report CEO/chair duality or that has a two tier unit management system is more likely to 
choose a high quality financial auditor. In fact, H3 incorporates the results found in H1 and H2, and these could 
be the reason why the coefficient is not different from zero. 
The existence of audit committee seems to influence the choice of high quality financial auditor in a positive 
way. That means that if a company has an audit committee then it is more likely to prefer a BIG4 company as 
financial auditor. Consequently, the assumption of H4 is also correct, even though no statistically significant 
coefficient was detected for DCOMT variable. 
As a whole, we consider that the coefficients associated to corporate governance variables were not 
meaningful due to transparency problems and due to the low number of observations that have been included 
into the analysis. 
5. Conclusions 
The present research tried to identify the corporate governance variable that can influence the choice of 
financial auditor as being a company from BIG 4 group. The research considers corporate governance variables 
such as: the CEO/chair duality, the tier management system, the combination between the lack of CEO/chair 
duality and the existence of two tier management system, the existence of audit committee and the number of 
executive directors from the board. The research was conducted upon the entities listed on the Bucharest Stock 
of Exchange. The results provide evidence that if the number of executive directors is increasing then there is a 
higher probability for the company to choose an auditor from BIG4 companies. The results are similar with 
those found by Lin and Liu, 2009. Considering the other variable, even though our assumptions were valid, 
there is no statistically significance from them. For example, if a company has an audit committee then it is 
more likely to choose an auditor from BIG4, as the sign associated with DCOMT variable is positive. 
Unfortunately, this coefficient is not statistically significant from zero. 
Regarding the tier management systems, it seems that the companies that have a one tier management system 
are less likely to choose a high quality financial auditor such as a BIG4 entity. The coefficient found in the 
regression model could be statistically significant from zero if we assumed a higher probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis. This could be done due to the fact that the sample upon which the analysis is conducted is quite 
small, having only 41 observations. As a consequence of these, no relevant impact for the combination between 
CEO/chair duality and the one tier management system variables upon the quality of financial auditor could be 
detected. 
We also encountered several problems when the analysis was conducted. One of them is due to a lack of 
transparency in reporting procedures, especially when it comes to auditors’ remuneration. Other problems are 
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related with the fact that data have been manually collected and that the analysis is conducted on a sample with 
few observations. 
Further research aims to include other companies into the analysis and to conduct an analysis using other 
way of estimation, such as a simultaneous equation model, as several variables can be inter-correlated. 
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Appendix A.  
The companies that have to report their individual financial statements according  to IFRS approach can be 
found at http://www.asfromania.ro/index.php/supraveghere/supraveghere-capital/emitenti-capital-
supraveghere/1721-lista-societati-incidente-omf-881-2012-emitenti-capital-supraveghere   
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